INTRODUCTION
On September 11, 2001 the world witnessed a highly sophisticated coordinated attack on the United States of America (U.S.) by a previously little known terrorist group, called al-Qaida. The, “hijacked commercial aircraft,” were flown by the assailants into the World Trade Center, and the Pentagon. A third target was believed to be the White House or U.S. Capitol building but the attackers were apparently overtaken by passengers and the plane crashed in a Pennsylvania field. The targets selected represent the pillars of democracy; the U.S. economy/people, the military, and the government, the attack marked a new chapter in American history. The battlefield of terrorism was officially expanded, now including not only the continental U.S. but targeting civilians on an unprecedented scale. Just nine-days after the attacks, President Bush, addressing the citizens of the United States of America, officially declared “War on Terrorism.” He stated, “Our war on terror begins with al-Qaida, but does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.” As we depart from familiar pavement and start down the muddy path of this war, we must ask, “Where will the path lead and does it have a discernable end?” The answers to these questions pose significant challenges to military strategists, and for guidance we turn to the Prussian military strategist whose theories have proven timeless, Carl von Clausewitz. This essay examines the “tenets of war,” as described by Clausewitz, relating to the U.S. “War on Terrorism” to determine how the U.S. should proceed down this uncharted path. Clausewitz stated, “There are three broad objectives which cover all aspects of war and need to be considered when contemplating declaring war: the opposing armed forces; the enemy’s country; and their will.” This essay applies these “tenets of war” to the “War on Terrorism” to determine our steps down this unmapped path.
OSAMA BIN LADEN AND THE AL-QAIDA ARMY
Before examining the U.S. strategy for the “War on Terrorism,” a brief background and explanation of the enemy’s grand strategy is in order. The undisputed founder and leader of al–Qaida is Usama bin Muhammad bin Ladin. Bin Laden established al–Qaida in 1984 as an organization of ex-Mujahedeen and other supporters with the primary mission of channeling fighters and funds to the Anti-Soviet Afghan resistance. By 1988 Bin Laden had recruited, funded, and lead approximately 30,000 troops from seven countries outside Afghanistan in the war against the former Soviet Union. In 1989, when the defeated Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan, Osama bin Laden returned to his home in Saudi Arabia as a war hero.
Whether or not bin Laden’s army and money contributed significantly to the defeat of Soviets is not important. This victory promoted bin Laden in the eyes of his army and they believed they were responsible for defeating a superpower. This success establishing bin Laden as a Moslem leader and recognized military strategist. Comments by bin Laden during an interview in 1995 indicated to the world that the war did not end with the defeat of the Soviets.
“…I discovered that it was not enough to fight in Afghanistan, but that we had to fight on all
fronts against communists or Western oppression. The urgent thing was communism but the next target was America…This is an open war up to the end, until victory.” Following the war, bin Laden’s army dispersed, though one would assume from his words they would be willing once again to return to fight the next enemy, the United States when bin Laden so ordered.
On August 2, 1990 Iraq invaded Kuwait and threatened the Saudi regime. Bin Laden, having been ordered confined to Jidda for his outspoken opposition to the Saudi alliance with the U.S. was forced to flee Saudi Arabia. He fled first to Afghanistan in 1990 and remained there until1992 when he went to Khartoun, Sudan. In 1995, Saudi Arabia permanently exiled bin Laden for openly criticizing King Fahd. In August 1996, after being expelled from Sudan bin Laden issued his “Declaration of War against the Americans Who Occupy the Land of the Two Holy Mosques.” The declaration elucidates bin Laden’s strategy for bringing the United States to its knees, as was done (in his view) to the former Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Bin Laden states, “Due to the imbalance of power between our armed forces and the enemy forces, a suitable means of fighting must be adopted, i.e. using fast-moving, light forces that work under complete secrecy. In other words, to fight a guerrilla war,…where the sons of the nation, and not the military forces, take part in it.”
Is bin Laden’s “guerrilla war” the ranting of a delusional religious sociopath or might there be precedents for such a “strategic plan?” Not long ago the U.S. was involved in a guerrilla war in South East Asia where the U.S. military tried to fight a conventional force-on-force war, decisively won every battle, but ultimately lost the war. Students of military strategy, like Clausewitz, know that examining your enemy’s historical political/military actions will identify patterns of weakness that can be exploited.
GENERAL GIAP AND VIET MINH ARMY
We must resist the temptation to think of terrorism as individual events, rather than linked components and to assume that are not part of the belligerents national strategy. To identify the most successful example of a national policy, or military strategy of war, based on guerrilla warfare, we need to look back a mere 63 years to an undisputed military leader of the Vietnam War, General Vo Nguyen Giap, described by his biographer Cecil B. Currey, “…the single greatest military genius of the twentieth century and one of the greatest of all time.”
The foundation for General Giap’s Viet Minh warfare strategy was based on a theory of dau tranh (struggle). There are two components of this strategy: political (population/government) and military. Both components must be used simultaneously to insure success. The military aspect of dau tranh does not limit the implementation of the military instruments of war to organized military armies, but allows for and encourages individual actions to include targeting civilian populations.
General Giap’s military strategy was comprised of three distinct phases. In the first phase, the enemy is much stronger and so the ‘revolutionaries’ (Giap’s word) must implement guerrilla warfare, avoiding force-on-force action. As support builds and more people join the movement, the second phase finds the military achieving rough parity with the state’s forces, and the revolution enters the “mobile” phase, – a combination of conventional war and guerrilla operations. In the third phase, the military becomes stronger than the enemy and enters the “offensive” stage where conventional forces engage the enemy’s armies. Understanding that this process takes many years, General Giap started his operations in 1935 against the French and ended in 1975 by defeating the South Vietnam and the United States. Based on these criteria as outlined by General Giap, we could assess that bin Laden and his army are currently in phase one of his “declared war with the United States.”
It is also important to note that moving from guerilla warfare to conventional warfare is not that unusual for emerging states or political movements. The American rebels followed the same policy in the Revolutionary War. It started with guerilla action (Boston Tea Party, Boston Massacre, etc), moved to parity (Saratoga, Trenton, etc), and concluded with force-on-force victory over Great Britain in Yorktown.
CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ AND STRATEGY
Clausewitz states that the act of war itself has no connection to the political purpose of the war. Acknowledging this pretext, the attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001 are tragic events but should not be the sole reason for declaring “War on Terrorism.” It is imperative the U.S. understand and target the reasons behind the acts of bin Laden and others like him. It is bin Laden’s political objectives that the U.S. must address as well if we are to successfully engage and defeat his army, al-Qaida. The three objectives outlined by Clausewitz that must be overcome when a country engages in war are: (1) the enemy’s armed forces; (2) their country; and (3) their will.2
1) THE ENEMIE’S ARMY
On September 14, 2001, just three-days after the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, Colin Powell, U.S. Secretary of State announced that Osama bin Laden, the Saudi whose terrorist network is based in Afghanistan, was believed to be behind the attacks. The ruling Taliban regime in Afghanistan was known to have had strong ties with bin Laden and his army, (al-Qaida), allowing them to train and move throughout the country unmolested. President Bush stated clearly to the world on September 20, 2001 that the Taliban must turn over “…all of the leaders of the al-Qaida who hide in your land.” He went on to indicate that “failure to turn them over would result in the sharing of al-Qaida’s fate.” In the same speech, the President identified that there are “…thousands of these [al-Qaida trained] terrorists in more than 60 countries.”1 The Taliban did not cooperate.
Clausewitz first point: engaging an enemy’s armed forces. On October 7, 2001 the United States, along with coalition forces, invaded Afghanistan and attacked the armies of al-Qaida and the Taliban, thereby addressing Clausewitz’s first point: engaging an enemy’s armed forces. The ensuing months resulted in a quick victory over Taliban forces and the capture or extermination of many high level al-Qaida military members. While these operations were winding down, the United States turned its attention to the armies of Iraq and Saddam Hussein. Iraq was selected and targeted for supporting or harboring primary terrorism targets, such as al-Qaida. This campaign was also successful but there was less evidence of bin Laden’s army and few if any high ranking al-Qaida members were identified in Iraq. Reports of Taliban strong holds in Afghanistan still exist, there has been minimal reporting of organized resistance by al-Qaida there or Iraq of late, leading; some to believe this army no longer exists.
2) THE BELLIGERENT’S COUNTRY
Secondly, Clausewitz identified needing to overcome the enemy’s country. Bin Laden recruited his original army in 1984 from Saudi Arabia (15 thousand), Yemen (5 thousand), Egypt (5 thousand), Algeria (2 thousand), Arab states of the Gulf (1 thousand), Libya (1 thousand) and Iraq (several hundred).3 The United States has troops on the ground in one fashion or another in Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Kuwait and Iraq. Bin Laden proclaimed in a statement aired on Al-Jazeera television November 3, 2001, “This war is fundamentally religious. The people of the East are Muslims. They sympathized with Muslims against the people of the West, who are the crusaders.” Taken literally this would indicate that any predominantly Muslim country could knowingly, or unknowingly, provide safe haven for bin Laden and his army. President Bush stated in his address to the world, “…we will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism. Every nation in every region now has a decision to make: Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.” 1 This statement, if carried out to fruition, will require bilateral agreements with Indonesia, Philippines, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Nigeria, Mauritania and all of the Middle East.
3) THE ENEMY’S WILL
Clausewitz’s third point, and maybe the most nebulous, attacking the ‘enemy’s will. Bin Laden has referred to this conflict as a “religious war” between Muslims and the West while President Bush has stated, “The enemy of America is not our many Muslim friends. It is not our many Arab friends. Our enemy is a radical network of terrorists and every government that supports them.”1 One needs to understand fundamental differences between these statements to determine if these opposing viewpoints reflect reality or rhetoric. Unlike Christianity, Islam is combined religion and a sociopolitical system. There is not a separation of church and state as in Western democracies. “The Prophet Muhammad was both a religious figure who received the Koran as a revelation from God, and a political ruler who conducted affairs of the state, engaging in diplomatic interactions with his neighbors, and fighting wars against his enemies.”3 So whether the West accepts the philosophy that this is to be a religious war or not is immaterial. Bin Laden and his followers believe this is a religious war, and thus the foundation of their ‘will to fight.’ Like Ho Chi Minh, the spiritual leader of the Vietnamese Communist regime, who wanted to reunite North and South Vietnam bin Laden wishs to reunite the Moslem community. In an interview on February 28, 1998 bin Laden articulated his ‘will’ to carry out this war.
We -- with Allah's help -- call on every Muslim who believes in Allah and wishes to be rewarded to comply with Allah's order to kill the Americans and plunder their money wherever and whenever they find it. We also call on Muslim ulema, leaders, youths, and soldiers to launch the raid on Satan's U.S. troops and the devil's supporters allying with them, and to displace those who are behind them so that they may learn a lesson. Almighty Allah said: "O ye who believe, give your response to Allah and His Apostle, when He calleth you to that which will give you life.
History is replete with religious wars that have spanned the centuries and resulted in some of the bloodiest conflicts known to man; conflicts unresolved and lingering yet today. The ability to overcome the enemies “will to fight” when their cause is religious-based may be an insurmountable obstacle. While religious wars experience periods of decreased military activity, the reasons behind the war are the fundamental disagreements between faiths — and these do not dissipate with the passing of time.
CAN THE U.S. WIN ACCORDING TO CLAUSEWITZ TENENTS?
The United States embarked on the “War on Terrorism” in a conventional manner, targeting bin Laden and his army which were believed to be residing in Afghanistan. Some would argue President Bush used this phrase, “War on Terrorism” figuratively: thus making military analysis of this conflict moot point. Nothing could be more naïve; this war has all the necessary trappings of war; military deployments, invasion, causalities, politics and nation building. For many years politicians attempted to downplay the Vietnam War by referring to it as a “conflict” or “undeclared war.” Regardless of how history records the Vietnam War it continues to linger in not only the minds of politicians and military leadership, but also the general populace when determining the validity of U.S. military involvement in any shooting wars.
The conventional approach of the U.S. government to war has been it’s preponderance of an opposing enemy/army/country. President Bush’s declaration of war made it clear to Afghani leadership, “that the Taliban must turn over …all of the leaders of the al-Qaida who hide in your land.” 1 The key word here is “hide,” when examining al-Qaida military doctrine, which is based on Viet Minh doctrine, there is no list of al-Qaida members, so it is doubtful if Taliban leadership could have turned over significant numbers of al-Qaida even if they wanted to. The U.S. demand also has religious conations; the current jihad against America and her allies according to bin Laden will lead Arabs and Muslims into the “golden age.” These idealistic politico-religious statements weigh heavy on the minds and hearts of devout Muslims who do not dismiss bin-Laden as a religious fanatic. After all, bin-Laden to them is a political/religious leader, similar to Ho Chi Minh.
The defeat of the Taliban was a victory for the U.S. but only in the sense that it temporarily disrupted training and planning in established safe havens for terrorists (al-Qaida). While al-Qaida’s ability to prosecute the war has been impacted, their command and control is still intact; exhibited by the release of audio tapes (latest Oct. 25 2003) by Osama bin Laden and his top deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, encouraging renewed attacks against American crusaders. Daily guerilla attacks on U.S and coalition forces occupying Afghanistan and Iraq continue in response to command requests. In addition, there are continued suicide bombings of civilian/political targets reinforcing the fact that the war continues. Bin Laden declared early on that his chosen method of warfare was a “guerilla war” stating, “…where the sons of the nation, and not the military forces, take part in it.” It is not certain if there is a functioning army of al-Qaida but one thing is for certain, they have not surrendered to the United States.
Invasion by the United States and occupation of al-Qaida territory has denied al-Qaida access to previous safe-havens. But does this fact alone meet the criteria set out by Clausewitz, regarding the occupation of the enemy’s country? Where is Bin Laden’s country? And in this unilaterally declared religious war, should the U.S. consider all Moslem countries as potentially non-friendly states?
Clausewitz’s emphasis on conquering the enemy’s land is based on the premise that this act will exact a toll on the enemy, wear him down and disrupt his ability to prosecute the war. The U.S. invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq have accomplished this mission but more importantly, sent a firm warning to other countries that providing a safe-haven for terrorists comes with a price tag. The question now remains will the U.S. continue to invade counties that are sympathetic to these groups as has been stated by President Bush and which one(s) will be next?
The enemy’s “will.” What progress has the United States made here? Conquering ones army and occupying his country can have a significant impact the enemies “will” -- who views their country as the “center of gravity,” but does ‘country’ matter in a religions war? On October 7, 2001 television broadcasts carried an audio tape of bin Laden, he indicated that geography is important when he said “…all the infidel armies leave the land of Muhammad…” The only question that remains is this a geographic region or religious mantra, meaning the whole world?
ARE CLAUSEWITZ WRITINGS RELAVANT?
The tenants of war set out by Carl Von Clausewitz identified three broad objectives which need to be addressed when contemplating war.2 The United States failed to adequately address these criterions prior to deploying military troops and is now hopelessly encumbered in Iraq and Afghanistan securing the peace and rebuilding these nations. If the “will” of the American people is one of bin Laden’s targets he has made significant inroads to bringing his Middle-East issues into American politics.
The United States must first accept that conventional military forces employed in guerilla war are at a significant disadvantage and will have limited success in the long term. Bin Laden can only win if the United States allows him to continue to dictate where, when and who his forces will fight. Next, this is a religious war, not between West and Moslems but a war between Moslems. Who will stand up and represent the non-fundamentalists Moslems? Do bin Laden and his army speak for all the Moslems of the world? It should not be the United States and other coalition members who continue to fight for the rights of Moslems.
The United States has done very little to address the concerns of Arabs and Moslems, generally tending to discount their religious beliefs when considering diplomatic decisions. This is a “religious war” and the U.S. ability to change the “enemies will” can only be accomplished, if at all, if U.S. polices directly confront the religious nature/characteristics of this conflict. The idea that a culture will go to war for religious reasons is alien to the Western world and taking this concept one step further, Westerner’s consider cultures that condone this idea as generally less developed. It is only when the belligerent is identified to be a person with whom you can negotiate and reach a mutual understanding that progress will be made.
Historically, after the U.S. gained freedom from Great Britain, has fought wars exclusively due to threats to the “national security.” This trend has resulted in clearly demarcated beginnings and ends to most wars – suing for peace -- meeting the belligerents to sign peace treaties and normalizing relations. This concept is not as transparent in a “religious war” when the belligerent would rather die then surrender to the Western Christendom, forgoing their religious beliefs. To win the peace the motivation must be mutually beneficial and not threaten the religious beliefs of either country.
There are those military and political strategists who indicate that Clausewitz’s philosophies apply only to unlimited warfare and that the United States current “War on Terrorism” is a limited war, very similar to Vietnam. It is convenient to dismiss Clausewitz’s theories of warfare as archaic and therefore not applicable; however, he may have provided politico-military strategists with the criterion needed to prosecute a successful war. If you cannot identify an enemy or their country maybe you can not attack their will and therefore, should not declare war on them? If this is what Clausewitz’s intentions were, then maybe the question that should be posed to President Bush and the American people. Is this a war? Should the U.S. have “officially” declared a “War on Terrorism?” With out an enemy, country and a will to attack how do you know when the war is over?
President Bush stated in a speech given to a joint session of Congress and the American people on September 20, 2001, “American are asking: How will we fight and win this war? We will direct every resource at our command -- every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon of war -- to the disruption and to the defeat of the global terror network.”1 Yes, Mr. President, but Americans are asking, “Can we win this war?”
REFERENCES
George W. Bush, Speech
“Declaring War on Terrorism,” 20
September 2001, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html (30 October 2003)
[1] Michael Howard and Peter Paret, “Carl Von Clausewitz,
On War,” (Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1989). 90
[1] Ahmed S. Hashim, “The World According to Usama Bin
Laden,”
http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/2001/Autumn/art1-au1.htm (30 October 2003)
[1] Frontline Television Program, Interview with “Osama
bin Laden verses the U.S. :Edicts and Statements”
www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/Binladen/who/edicts.html (30 October 2003)
[1] Osama bin Laden, “Declaration of War against
the Americans occupying the Land of the two Holy Places,” August 1998. http://www.mobrien.com/twr/bin_laden.htm (30 October 2003)
[1] Cecil B. Currey, “Victory At Any Cost: The
Genius of Viet Nam’s Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap,” (Washington: Brassey’s, Inc., 1997)
318
[1] Douglas Pike, “PAVN: People’s Army on Vietnam,” (New
York: Presidio Press, 1986) 2
[1] Phillip B. Davidson, “Vietnam at War; The
History: 1946 – 1975,” (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1988) 26.
[1]
Toby Harnden and Anton La Guardia, “Bush declares all-out war on the havens of
terrorism,” News Telegraph www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2001.09/14/wwar14.xml
[1] Transcript from statement made by Osam Bin
Laden, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/monitoring/media_report/1636782.stm
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