Thursday, July 25, 2013

HIV AND WORLD ORDER


”Clearly, AIDS is no longer just a health problem.  It is a developmental crisis with potentially ominous consequences for Africa and the world.”[1] 

Context:
         As a region, Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is characterized by having the greatest infectious disease burden, the weakest public health infrastructure, highest birth rates, lowest annual income, poorest economic outlook, highest illiteracy rates, largest number of displaced persons, poorly trained and equipped militaries, and a history of corrupt governments.[2]  If this were not enough, Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV)[*], an emerging infectious disease, made its début in SSA in the early 1980s and has been wreaking havoc on this region’s population ever since.
         Currently SSA sports some alarming statistics: 72% of the world’s HIV infections in only 10% of the world’s population and 80% of the world’s HIV-positive women.  For comparison, SSA adults are 30 times more likely to be infected than those in Brazil or India, and 300 times more likely to be infected than adults in China.  The impact of this devastating disease on SSA, may most likely be the coup de grǎce for these fragile biosocial, economical, and governmental systems that are struggling to make there way in the world and demand exploration and hopefully further elucidation.
         The risk of this pandemic to regional and global stability breaks the traditional notions of security based on territorial sovereignty and integrity.[3]  Examining the region as a whole adequately contextualizes the global problem but does not provide the granularity needed for comprehending the myriad of socio-economic factors contributing to the epidemic.  This can only be done when the region is explored on a country-by-country basis.  For the purposes of this essay we examine the HIV epidemic in three West Africa countries: Nigeria, Ghana, and Senegal in greater detail.
Background:
          Just five years ago the International Labor Office in Geneva described an “AIDS belt” across East and Central Africa with an approximate 10% prevalence rate, reporting relatively few cases in West, southern, and northern Africa.[4]  In 2004, many countries in Africa’s southern cone have adult prevalence rates exceeding 25%, and there is very little hope that West Africa will not follow this trend. 
         HIV/AIDS is much more then a health problem.  The loss of people during the most productive years of their lives will certainly affect individual countries overall prosperities and capabilities throughout SSA.  The macroeconomic impact of these early deaths is difficult to assess due to varied mechanisms by which AIDS will impact the overall economic performance.  AIDS deaths lead directly to a reduction in the number of prime workers available.  Less experienced and educated workers replacing those who have died, could potentially lead to lower productivity.  A shortage of workers leads to higher wages and increased migration, which leads to higher domestic production costs and loss of international competitiveness.  Reduced savings because of greater health care expenditure and a loss of worker incomes can generate a significant drop in capital accumulation savings.[5]
         The high numbers of HIV infected military members may increase instability of the region in the coming years.  Militaries of SSA typically do not test for HIV with any regularity, if at all, and depend on United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions to financially support their militaries.  The movement of highly infected soldiers has contributed to the pandemic, and in the near future countries partaking in UN sponsored activities will be required to test and remove infected military members from peacekeeping missions.  For many of the SSA nations that are already politically unstable, even the perception of a weakened military can make them susceptible to an internal coup d’etat or possible enemy attack.
GHANA
Ghana is well endowed with natural resources, has roughly twice the per capita output of the poorer countries in West Africa, and remains heavily dependent on international financial and technical assistance.  The economy revolves around subsistence agriculture, which accounts for 36% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and employs 60% of the work force.  In 1992 approximately 31% of the population subsisted below the poverty line.[6][†]
Human Cost: In 2003, Ghana’s estimated population was 20.5 million with a median age of 19.8 and a life expectancy of 56 years.  The first case of HIV was reported in Ghana in March of 1986.    In 2001 the number of adult Ghanaians living with HIV/AIDS was estimated to be 360,000 (3%), 70% of those are female, and with an additional ~ 28,000 deaths due to HIV/AIDS.  In 2004, the Ministry of Health in Ghana estimates the number of orphans, due to death of parent(s) to AIDS, to be 200,000.[‡]
Questions:
1.   Given the experience of other SSA countries, why do you think Ghana’s HIV/AIDS rate is much lower comparably, and where do you see prevalence rates going in the next 5 years?
2.   The HIV rates in women are very high compared to Senegal where male infection rates exceed women by 1.3:1.  What do you see a much higher rate in women in Ghana?

Economic Impact: Economically speaking what makes HIV/AIDS so important to national development is that it virtually affects the development effort in all sectors.  In the health sector the cost of AIDS will have a major impact on the allocation of health resources.  Treatment with antiretroviral drugs for infection with HIV indicates an annual cost of ~ 45 million Cedis ($5,120 US) per patient.  Treating opportunistic infections for AIDS ranges between 36,308 –380,350 Cedis ($5.19 – 54.34 US) per episode of illness.[7]  Raw health care costs are minuscule compared to the loss of people from the labor force due to AIDS illnesses and death.  With 60% of the work force earning their living from subsistence and commercial agriculture, decimation in the labor force will result in local malnutrition and substantial decreases in available agriculture exports.
Question:
1.   It appears that unless the current HIV trend is reversed, Ghana will experience a labor shortage in the coming years.  What propositions have been developed to address these eventualities? 

Social Cost: The increase of orphans due to AIDS deaths puts additional strain on families and social systems.  The care of orphaned children falls to orphanages, extended family members, an adolescent member of the family taking over as head of household, or finds children relegated to living on the streets.  This is especially difficult in major urban centers where traditional family structures are not as strong as in the countryside.  Many orphans will never receive adequate health care and schooling.  As far as societal implications there will also be a long-term burden on social services responsible for providing orphanages, health care, and schools fees.  Skilled workers and professionals are precious commodities in all countries, and substantial losses will add an additionally strain to not only their respective fields but also on education systems suffering from the same shortfall. 
Questions:
1.   The impact of HIV/AIDS cases in teachers will reduce their availability to the educational sector and result in a general shortage of qualified instructors.  This shortage will be repeated many times over in other skilled and professional occupations as well.  Since education is the lynchpin for renewal of these valuable resources, does the government of Ghana have a plan for filling this void?
2.   School enrollment and attendance is currently declining with the postulated cause is said to be, the rising infection rates among the youth or families requiring children to stay at home to care for sick family members.  How are these issues addressed in the current policies?
3.   Socio-cultural factors such as stigma and denial make the care and support for people living with HIV/AIDS by family members and healthcare workers a daunting challenge.  Do you have programs that address these issues?

Military Preparedness: Evidence derived from the southern African countries where this epidemic has had more time to mature, shows military HIV prevalence rates generally run two to three times higher than the population at large.  With 20 to 50% of the Ghanaian military expected to become HIV positive over the next 2 to 5 years, it is reasonable to expect a tremendous degradation in combat readiness.  In addition, there is concern over the increasing loss of high-ranking military officers and the impact this will have on the internal stability of the military.
Questions:
1.   Given that military members in SSA experience 2-3 times higher HIV rates then the general public, do you anticipate instituting any new criteria for new and current military members?
2.   How would you view a UN mandate requiring only HIV negative soldiers being allowed to participate in peacekeeping missions?  

Security Factor (Stability): In January 2001, for the first time since transition to democracy almost a decade earlier, a new government took over in Ghana.  The sad nature of Ghana’s economic problems continue into 2004 with a 30 to 50% inflation rate, high levels of poverty, worsening income distribution, lack of consistent growth, rising urban unemployment, and overwhelming debt.  The most significant policy issue is how to achieve macroeconomic stabilization in the shortest possible time without compromising steady long-tem growth?[8]
Question:
1.   Given the gravity of problems facing Ghana over the next five years, how would you characterize the impact of HIV on Ghana’s ability to make progress?
 
SENEGAL
Senegal's economy, fourth largest in Western Africa, follows Nigeria, Ghana, and Côte d'Ivoire.  The agricultural sector contributes one-fifth of the GDP and supports 75% of the working population.  Approximately 12% of the land is currently arable.  The marine fishing industry is the leading exporter followed by groundnuts, phosphate, and iron ore products.  Senegal maintains a long history of military participation in international peacekeeping operations.

 Human Cost: According to 2003 data the population is estimated to be 10.5 million; median age 17.8 years and life expectance at birth 56 years.  The first case of HIV was identified in 1986.    In 2001 approximately 27,000 (0.5%) adults were HIV positive and there were 2,500 deaths.  Reports indicate that the sex ratio for HIV infection is 1.3:1 (9 males for 7 females),[9] unlike Ghana, which identified 80% of infections, were in women.  The major religion is Islamic with 94% of the population practicing this faith. 

Questions:
1.   Given the experience of other SSA countries, why do you think Senegal’s HIV/AIDS rate has remained comparably low and where do you see prevalence rates heading in the next 5 years?
2.   Senegal has seen more HIV cases in men then in women.  For example, Ghana has seen 80% of the cases are in women.  What explanation(s) would you provide to illuminate this finding?
3.   How does your approach to the HIV/AIDS issues fit into your general public health policy?
 
Economic Impact: The economic effects of AIDS will be initially felt by individuals and their families and ripple outwardly to agriculture, then businesses, and finally the macro-economy.  This being the case the agricultural economy, which employs 74% of the economically active population, will be hit first and hardest.  AIDS will affect the health sector in at least two ways: first in the number of AIDS patients seeking medical treatment, and second, from the financial impact of treating these patients.[10]  In 1997, the Ministry of Health decided to introduce triple cocktail therapy beginning in 1998.  While the cost of this therapy is typically ~ 600,000 Communaute Financiere Africaine (CFA) ($1,000 US) per month, the government negotiated a price of 362,000 CFA ($603 US) per month.  It is unclear if this program continues and if and when these drugs are offered to all newly identified HIV positive people but if the program has continued, the present approximate cost is $1.5 (US) million per month.[11] 
Question:
1.   The costs associated with HIV diagnosis and AIDS treatment is expensive.  Senegal is one of the few SSA countries that has able to offer this treatment.  How many people have you enrolled in this program and do you anticipate continuing the program? 

Social Cost: The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has singled out Senegal for its positive results in HIV prevention over the last two decades, attributing their success to early active governmental support into aggressive prevention programs.  The mode of HIV transmission in Senegal is mainly heterosexual.  Senegal’s Muslim majority (94%) and Catholic minority have been generally supportive of government programs, where in most countries these religious groups typically condemn those infected with HIV.  
Question:
1.   How did the religious authorities react to the epidemic?  

Military Preparedness: Senegal has ~ 16,500 military personnel including security forces.  The military requires testing for all military members participating in selected deployments.  New recruits and those applying for promotions are tested as well.  
Questions:
1.   When mandatory testing identifies an HIV positive military member, is the member allowed to stay in the military?  What treatment is available? Are family members tested as well?
2.   When soldiers return from extended deployments is there a follow-up testing program?
3.  How would you view a UN mandate requiring only HIV negative soldiers be allow participation in peacekeeping missions?  

Security Factor (Stability): In January 1994, Senegal undertook numerous economic reform initiatives with the support of the international donor community.  This reform began with a 50% devaluation of Senegal's currency, the CFA franc.  In addition, government price controls and subsidies have been steadily dismantled since.  This brought a real growth in GDP of 5.6% in 1996 and 4.7% in 1997 after a sluggish economic growth in previous years.  With an external debt of $2,495 (US) million, and its economic reform program on track, Senegal qualified for the multilateral debt relief initiative for heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC).  Progress on structural reforms is on track, but the pace of reforms remains slow as delays occured in implementing a number of measures on the privatization program, good governance issues, and the promotion of private sector activity.  However, macroeconomic indicators show that Senegal turned in a respectable performance in meeting International Monetary Fund targets in 2000 with an annual GDP growth increased of 5.7%, as compared to 5.1% in 1999.  Inflation was reported to be 0.7%, compared to 0.8% in 1999, and the current account deficit (excluding transfers) was held at less than 6% of GDP.[12]
Question:
1.     As more and more people become infected with HIV in SSA, and given the success of Senegal in providing HIV infected persons with education and treatment, is there any concern that people from these countries will come to Senegal seeking treatment for HIV/AIDS?  And if this is a concern, how do you plan to address this? 
 
NIGERIA
The most populous country in Africa, Nigeria accounts for approximately one-fourth of West Africa's people.  Although less than 25% of Nigerians are urban dwellers, at least 24 cities have populations of more than 100,000.  <small>Nigeria is Africa's leading oil producer.  Following nearly 16 years of military rule, a new constitution was adopted in 1999 and a peaceful transition to civilian government was completed.  The current president faces the daunting task of rebuilding a petroleum-based economy whose revenues have been squandered through corruption and mismanagement, and institutionalizing democracy.  In addition, the administration must defuse longstanding ethnic and religious tensions if it is to build a sound foundation for economic growth and political stability.  Despite some irregularities, the April 2003 elections marked the first civilian transfer of power in Nigeria's history.  </small><small>Nigeria's economy is highly dependent on the capital-intensive oil industry, which contributes ~ 95% of export earnings and 75% of government revenue.  The bulk of the population is engaged in agriculture, which contributes about 30% of GDP.  By 2000 Nigeria's per capita income had plunged to about one-quarter of its mid-1970s high. </small>
Human Cost:  In 2003 Nigeria’s estimated population was 134 million with a median age of 18 years and a life expectancy at birth of 51 years.  The first case of HIV in Nigeria was identified in 1986.    In 2001, the number of adult Nigerians living with HIV/AIDS was estimated to be 3.5 million (5.8%) with approximately 170,000 deaths.  In 2003, the United States Agency for International Development estimated 1 million orphaned children were living in Nigeria due to AIDS.  Several factors have contributed to the rapid spread of HIV in Nigeria: sexual networking practices such as polygamy, a high prevalence of untreated sexually transmitted diseases, low condom use, low social status of women, stigmatization, and a denial of HIV infection.[13] 
Question:
1.  Compared to other SSA countries, why do you think Nigeria’s HIV/AIDS rate is much lower comparably and where do you see prevalence rates going in the next 5 years?
 
Economic Impact: Data on the economic impact are limited but a recently developed United Nations model has predicted that the impact on economic growth is potentially larger in Nigeria than the overall SSA average.  Using this model the cost of HIV/AIDS to the country would be $2-3 (US) per capita or approximately 0.8% of the GDP.  This model developed by the United Nations Program for HIV/AIDS shows how increasing mortality rates have led to a discontinuity in education with many pupils losing or having a change of their teachers.  The potential impact on sectors such as agriculture, households, and firms show an increase in costs and expenditures particularly labor costs, reductions in savings, and shifting productivity patterns.[14]  The USAID allocated $14.5 (US) million for HIV/AIDS activities in 2002 and $24.6 (US) million in 2003.[15] 
Question:
1.It appears that unless the current HIV trend is reversed, Nigeria will experience a labor shortage in the coming years.  What propositions have been developed to address these realities? 

Social Cost: The Nigerian society is characterized by rivalry and tension between regions and ethno-religious groups.  The variety of customs, languages, and traditions among Nigeria's 250 ethnic groups gives the country a rich diversity.  The dominant ethnic group in the northern two-thirds of the country is the Hausa-Fulani, most of whom are Muslim.  HIV/AIDS having already taken hold in the general population has placed family breadwinners, as well as key leaders in government and industry at substantial risk.  Through their loss the country’s economy faces potential devastation.  The spread of HIV/AIDS is believed to be via heterosexual activities. 
Questions:
1.     The impact of HIV/AIDS cases in teachers will reduce their availability to the educational sector and result in a general shortage of qualified instructors.  This shortage will be repeated many times over in other skilled and professional occupations as well.  Since education is the lynchpin for the renewal of these valuable resources, does the government of Nigeria have a plan for filling this void?
2.     School enrollment and attendance are currently declining, and the postulated cause is said to be rising infection rates among the youth or families, requiring children to stay at home to care for sick family members.  How are these issues being addressed in the current policies?
3.     Socio-cultural factors such as stigma and denial make the care and support for people living with HIV/AIDS by family members and healthcare workers a daunting challenge.  Do you have programs that address these issues?

Military Preparedness: Nigerian military leaders are resistant to initiating greater transparency and accountability in managing the country's multibillion-dollar oil earnings, and these propensities continue to limit economic growth and prevent an agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and bilateral creditors on debt relief.  There are approximately 76,000 active duty personnel in Nigeria’s three service branches.  The Nigerian Army, the largest of the services, has about 60,000 personnel deployed in two mechanized infantry divisions.  The military has demonstrated its capability and willingness to mobilize, deploy, and sustain battalions in support of peacekeeping operations in Liberia, Yugoslavia, Angola, Rwanda, Somalia, and Sierra Leone.  The Nigerian Armed Forces Program on HIV/AIDS Control (AFPAC) has coordinated HIV/AIDS activities for the Nigerian Army, Navy, and Air Force since 1987.  The U.S. Government has been the primary international donor to AFPAC.  Since 2000, the project has targeted increased awareness of HIV/AIDS and sexually transmitted infections, increased availability of condoms, and has mitigated the impact of HIV/AIDS through home based care and support of people living with HIV/AIDS.[16]  The Nigerian government plans to provide free antiretroviral drugs to HIV positive soldiers from the consignment of about $3.7 (US) million worth of generic antiretroviral drugs it recently purchased from India at a subsidized price.[17]  The Nigeria military is not routinely tested for HIV. 
Questions:
1.  The Armed Forces represent a large and important segment of the Nigerian population whose occupation puts them at increased risk of sexually transmitted infections such as HIV/AIDS.  Given the experiences of other SSA militaries do you have policies in place or anticipate instituting any new testing criteria for new or current military members?
2.  How would you view a UN mandate to require only HIV negative soldiers be allowed to participate in peace keeping missions?  

Security Factor (Stability): Nigeria's official foreign debt is about $28.5 (US) billion of which approximately 75% is owed to Paris Club countries.  A substantial portion of this debt is interest and payment in arrears.  In August 2000 the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Nigeria signed a one-year Stand-by Arrangement (SBA) leading to a December debt rescheduling agreement Nigeria and its Paris Club creditors.  By August 2001, despite continued dialogue with the IMF, Nigeria had been unable to implement many of the SBA conditions and as of September 2001, only a few of Nigeria's creditor governments had signed bilateral rescheduling agreements.  Any long-term debt relief will require strong and sustained economic reforms over a number of years.  Along with the endemic malaise of Nigeria's non-oil sectors, the economy continues to witness massive growth of "informal sector" economic activities, estimated by some to be as high as 75% of the total economy.  However, the largely subsistence agricultural sector has failed to keep pace with the rapid population growth and Nigeria, once a large net exporter of food, must now import food.  Nigeria launched an ambitious development program to create a large industrial sector to lessen its dependence on oil and agriculture but nonetheless, massive external debts combined with political instability, corruption, and poor macroeconomic management have hampered its implementation.  Inflation, which had fallen to 0% in April 2000, reached 14.5% by year-end and 18.7% in August 2001.[18]  Although the government 's anti-corruption campaign has thus far been disappointing, progress in injecting transparency and accountability into economic decision-making is notable.
Question:
1.  Given the gravity of problems facing Nigeria over the next five years, how would you characterize the direct impact of HIV on Nigeria’s ability to continue to make progress?


 



[*] HIV disease is characterized by a gradual deterioration of immune function. Most notably, crucial immune cells called CD4+ T cells are disabled and killed during the typical course of infection.  These cells, sometimes called "T-helper cells," play a central role in the immune response, signaling other cells in the immune system to perform their special functions.  A healthy, uninfected person usually has 800 to 1,200 CD4+ T cells per cubic millimeter (mm3) of blood.  During HIV infection, the number of these cells in a person's blood progressively declines.  When a person's CD4+ T cell count falls below 200/mm3, he or she becomes particularly vulnerable to the opportunistic infections and cancers that typify.  Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS), the end stage of HIV disease.  People with AIDS often suffer infections of the lungs, intestinal tract, brain, eyes and other organs as well as debilitating weight loss, diarrhea, neurologic conditions and cancers such as Kaposi's sarcoma and certain types of lymphomas. Most scientists think that HIV causes AIDS by directly inducing the death of CD4+ T cells or interfering with their normal function, and by triggering other events that weaken a person's immune function.  For example, the network of signaling molecules that normally regulates a person's immune response is disrupted during HIV disease, impairing a person's ability to fight other infections.  The HIV-mediated destruction of the lymph nodes and related immunologic organs also plays a major role in causing the immunosuppression seen in people with AIDS.
Written in 2004

[†] Country and human facts and figures for all three countries studied here are all taken from the CIA Fact Book, 2004 edition or United States State Department on-line country profiles.
[‡] An AIDS orphan is a child under 15 who has lost either mother or both parents to AIDS.


REFERENCES


[1] Platform on action on HIV/AIDS in the context of the world of work in Africa, 88th Session, ILO, May 2000


[2] Jennifer Brower and Peter Chalk, The Global Threat of New and Reemerging Infectious Diseases. Rand Publishing, Pittsburgh, PA,  2003, p 42
[3] Jennifer Brower and Peter Chalk, The Global Threat of New and Reemerging Infectious Diseases. Rand Publishing, Pittsburgh, PA,  2003, p 42
[4] Africa Development Forum 2000, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 3-7 December 2000 p 2
[5] HIV/AIDS in Ghana, National AIDS/STI Control Programme Disease Control Unit, Ministry of Health, Ghana. 3rd Edition; December 2001, p 40
[6] CIA world Fact Book, 2003 edition
[7] HIV/AIDS in Ghana, National AIDS/STI Control Programme Disease Control Unit, Ministry of Health, Ghana. 3rd Edition; December 2001, p 40)
[8] Ernest Aryeetey, Macroeconomic Stability, Growth and Poverty Reduction in Ghana, Second Workshop: The Research Agenda, Cornell University, October 2001, p 4
[9] Mandiaye Loume, 2nd Global TB/HIV working Group Meeting, Durban, June 2002
[10] Lori Bollinger, Stover J. and Diop I, The Economic Impact of AIDS in Senegal, The Futures Group International, The Centre for Development and Population Activities, September 1999.
[11] Diop, I., Unpublished data, taken from a Consultant Report, 1999
[15] Country Profile, United States Agency for International Development, Bureau for Global Health, July 2003.
[16]  The United States Diplomatic Mission to Nigeria, March 2004
[17] Abiodun Raufu Lagos, Nigeria promises free antiretroviral drugs to HIV positive soldiers, BMJ 2002;324:870 ( 13 April  2004)

Monday, July 22, 2013

WAR ON WAR


Insanity: doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results. Albert Einstein 
INTRODUCTION
On September 11, 2001 the world witnessed a highly sophisticated coordinated attack on the United States of America (U.S.) by a previously little known terrorist group, called al-Qaida.  The, “hijacked commercial aircraft,” were flown by the assailants into the World Trade Center, and the Pentagon. A third target was believed to be the White House or U.S. Capitol building but the attackers were apparently overtaken by passengers and the plane crashed in a Pennsylvania field. The targets selected represent the pillars of democracy; the U.S. economy/people, the military, and the government, the attack marked a new chapter in American history.  The battlefield of terrorism was officially expanded, now including not only the continental U.S. but targeting civilians on an unprecedented scale. Just nine-days after the attacks, President Bush, addressing the citizens of the United States of America, officially declared “War on Terrorism.”  He stated, “Our war on terror begins with al-Qaida, but does not end there.  It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.”  As we depart from familiar pavement and start down the muddy path of this war, we must ask, “Where will the path lead and does it have a discernable end?”  The answers to these questions pose significant challenges to military strategists, and for guidance we turn to the Prussian military strategist whose theories have proven timeless, Carl von Clausewitz.    This essay examines the “tenets of war,” as described by Clausewitz, relating to the U.S. “War on Terrorism” to determine how the U.S. should proceed down this uncharted path.   Clausewitz stated, “There are three broad objectives which cover all aspects of war and need to be considered when contemplating declaring war: the opposing armed forces; the enemy’s country; and their will.”  This essay applies these “tenets of war” to the “War on Terrorism” to determine our steps down this unmapped path. 
OSAMA BIN LADEN AND THE AL-QAIDA ARMY
Before examining the U.S. strategy for the “War on Terrorism,” a brief background and explanation of the enemy’s grand strategy is in order. The undisputed founder and leader of al–Qaida is Usama bin Muhammad bin Ladin.  Bin Laden established al–Qaida in 1984 as an organization of ex-Mujahedeen and other supporters with the primary mission of channeling fighters and funds to the Anti-Soviet Afghan resistance.  By 1988 Bin Laden had recruited, funded, and lead approximately 30,000 troops from seven countries outside Afghanistan in the war against the former Soviet Union.  In 1989, when the defeated Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan, Osama bin Laden returned to his home in Saudi Arabia as a war hero.  
Whether or not bin Laden’s army and money contributed significantly to the defeat of Soviets is not important.  This victory promoted bin Laden in the eyes of his army and they believed they were responsible for defeating a superpower.  This success establishing bin Laden as a Moslem leader and recognized military strategist.  Comments by bin Laden during an interview in 1995 indicated to the world that the war did not end with the defeat of the Soviets. 
“…I discovered that it was not enough to fight in Afghanistan, but that we had to fight on all 
fronts against communists or Western oppression.  The urgent thing was communism but the next target was America…This is an open war up to the end, until victory.”  Following the war, bin Laden’s army dispersed, though one would assume from his words they would be willing once again to return to fight the next enemy, the United States when bin Laden so ordered.
On August 2, 1990 Iraq invaded Kuwait and threatened the Saudi regime. Bin Laden, having been ordered confined to Jidda for his outspoken opposition to the Saudi alliance with the U.S. was forced to flee Saudi Arabia.  He fled first to Afghanistan in 1990 and remained there until1992 when he went to Khartoun, Sudan. In 1995, Saudi Arabia permanently exiled bin Laden for openly criticizing King Fahd.  In August 1996, after being expelled from Sudan bin Laden issued his “Declaration of War against the Americans Who Occupy the Land of the Two Holy Mosques.”  The declaration elucidates bin Laden’s strategy for bringing the United States to its knees, as was done (in his view) to the former Soviet Union in Afghanistan.  Bin Laden states, “Due to the imbalance of power between our armed forces and the enemy forces, a suitable means of fighting must be adopted, i.e. using fast-moving, light forces that work under complete secrecy.  In other words, to fight a guerrilla war,…where the sons of the nation, and not the military forces, take part in it.”     
Is bin Laden’s “guerrilla war” the ranting of a delusional religious sociopath or might there be precedents for such a “strategic plan?”  Not long ago the U.S. was involved in a guerrilla war in South East Asia where the U.S. military tried to fight a conventional force-on-force war,  decisively won every battle, but ultimately  lost the war.  Students of military strategy, like Clausewitz, know that examining your enemy’s historical political/military actions will identify patterns of weakness that can be exploited.   
GENERAL GIAP AND VIET MINH ARMY
We must resist the temptation to think of terrorism as individual events, rather than linked components and to assume that are not part of the belligerents national strategy. To identify the most successful example of a national policy, or military strategy of war, based on guerrilla warfare, we need to look back a mere 63 years to an undisputed military leader of the Vietnam War, General Vo Nguyen Giap, described by his biographer Cecil B. Currey, “…the single greatest military genius of the twentieth century and one of the greatest of all time.”
The foundation for General Giap’s Viet Minh warfare strategy was based on a theory of dau tranh (struggle).  There are two components of this strategy: political (population/government) and military.  Both components must be used simultaneously to insure success.  The military aspect of dau tranh does not limit the implementation of the military instruments of war to organized military armies, but allows for and encourages individual actions to include targeting civilian populations. 
General Giap’s military strategy was comprised of three distinct phases.  In the first phase, the enemy is much stronger and so the ‘revolutionaries’ (Giap’s word) must implement guerrilla warfare, avoiding force-on-force action. As support builds and more people join the movement, the second phase finds the military achieving rough parity with the state’s forces, and the revolution enters the “mobile” phase, – a combination of conventional war and guerrilla operations. In the third phase, the military becomes stronger than the enemy and enters the “offensive” stage where conventional forces engage the enemy’s armies. Understanding that this process takes many years, General Giap started his operations in 1935 against the French and ended in 1975 by defeating the South Vietnam and the United States.   Based on these criteria as outlined by General Giap, we could assess that bin Laden and his army are currently in phase one of his “declared war with the United States.”  
It is also important to note that moving from guerilla warfare to conventional warfare is not that unusual for emerging states or political movements.  The American rebels followed the same policy in the Revolutionary War.  It started with guerilla action (Boston Tea Party, Boston Massacre, etc), moved to parity (Saratoga, Trenton, etc), and concluded with force-on-force victory over Great Britain in Yorktown.
CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ AND STRATEGY
Clausewitz states that the act of war itself has no connection to the political purpose of the war.  Acknowledging this pretext, the attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001 are tragic events but should not be the sole reason for declaring “War on Terrorism.”  It is imperative the U.S. understand and target the reasons behind the acts of bin Laden and others like him. It is bin Laden’s political objectives that the U.S. must address as well if we are to successfully engage and defeat his army, al-Qaida.  The three objectives outlined by Clausewitz that must be overcome when a country engages in war are: (1) the enemy’s armed forces; (2) their country; and (3) their will.2  
1) THE ENEMIE’S ARMY
On September 14, 2001, just three-days after the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, Colin Powell, U.S. Secretary of State announced that Osama bin Laden, the Saudi whose terrorist network is based in Afghanistan, was believed to be behind the attacks. The ruling Taliban regime in Afghanistan was known to have had strong ties with bin Laden and his army, (al-Qaida), allowing them to train and move throughout the country unmolested.  President Bush stated clearly to the world on September 20, 2001 that the Taliban must turn over “…all of the leaders of the al-Qaida who hide in your land.”  He went on to indicate that “failure to turn them over would result in the sharing of al-Qaida’s fate.”  In the same speech, the President identified that there are “…thousands of these [al-Qaida trained] terrorists in more than 60 countries.”1 The Taliban did not cooperate. 
Clausewitz first point: engaging an enemy’s armed forces.  On October 7, 2001 the United States, along with coalition forces, invaded Afghanistan and attacked the armies of al-Qaida and the Taliban, thereby addressing Clausewitz’s first point:  engaging an enemy’s armed forces.  The ensuing months resulted in a quick victory over Taliban forces and the capture or extermination of many high level al-Qaida military members.  While these operations were winding down, the United States turned its attention to the armies of Iraq and Saddam Hussein. Iraq was selected and targeted for supporting or harboring primary terrorism targets, such as al-Qaida. This campaign was also successful but there was less evidence of bin Laden’s army and few if any high ranking al-Qaida members were identified in Iraq.   Reports of Taliban strong holds in Afghanistan still exist, there has been minimal reporting of organized resistance by al-Qaida there or Iraq of late, leading; some to believe this army no longer exists.  
2) THE BELLIGERENT’S COUNTRY
Secondly, Clausewitz identified needing to overcome the enemy’s country.  Bin Laden recruited his original army in 1984 from Saudi Arabia (15 thousand), Yemen (5 thousand), Egypt (5 thousand), Algeria (2 thousand), Arab states of the Gulf (1 thousand), Libya (1 thousand) and Iraq (several hundred).3 The United States has troops on the ground in one fashion or another in Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Kuwait and Iraq.  Bin Laden proclaimed in a statement aired on Al-Jazeera television November 3, 2001, “This war is fundamentally religious. The people of the East are Muslims. They sympathized with Muslims against the people of the West, who are the crusaders.”  Taken literally this would indicate that any predominantly Muslim country could knowingly, or unknowingly, provide safe haven for bin Laden and his army.  President Bush stated in his address to the world, “…we will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism.  Every nation in every region now has a decision to make: Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.” 1    This statement, if carried out to fruition, will require bilateral agreements with Indonesia, Philippines, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Nigeria, Mauritania and all of the Middle East.  
3) THE ENEMY’S WILL 
Clausewitz’s third point, and maybe the most nebulous, attacking the ‘enemy’s will.  Bin Laden has referred to this conflict as a “religious war” between Muslims and the West while President Bush has stated, “The enemy of America is not our many Muslim friends. It is not our many Arab friends. Our enemy is a radical network of terrorists and every government that supports them.”1 One needs to understand fundamental differences between these statements to determine if these opposing viewpoints reflect reality or rhetoric. Unlike Christianity, Islam is combined religion and a sociopolitical system. There is not a separation of church and state as in Western democracies. “The Prophet Muhammad was both a religious figure who received the Koran as a revelation from God, and a political ruler who conducted affairs of the state, engaging in diplomatic interactions with his neighbors, and fighting wars against his enemies.”3 So whether the West accepts the philosophy that this is to be a religious war or not is immaterial. Bin Laden and his followers believe this is a religious war, and thus the foundation of their ‘will to fight.’ Like Ho Chi Minh, the spiritual leader of the Vietnamese Communist regime, who wanted to reunite North and South Vietnam bin Laden wishs to reunite the Moslem community.   In an interview on February 28, 1998 bin Laden articulated his ‘will’ to carry out this war. 
We -- with Allah's help -- call on every Muslim who believes in Allah and wishes to be rewarded to comply with Allah's order to kill the Americans and plunder their money wherever and whenever they find it. We also call on Muslim ulema, leaders, youths, and soldiers to launch the raid on Satan's U.S. troops and the devil's supporters allying with them, and to displace those who are behind them so that they may learn a lesson. Almighty Allah said: "O ye who believe, give your response to Allah and His Apostle, when He calleth you to that which will give you life. 

History is replete with religious wars that have spanned the centuries and resulted in some of the bloodiest conflicts known to man; conflicts unresolved and lingering yet today. The ability to overcome the enemies “will to fight” when their cause is religious-based may be an insurmountable obstacle.  While religious wars experience periods of decreased military activity, the reasons behind the war are the fundamental disagreements between faiths — and these do not dissipate with the passing of time.
CAN THE U.S. WIN ACCORDING TO CLAUSEWITZ TENENTS?
The United States embarked on the “War on Terrorism” in a conventional manner, targeting bin Laden and his army which were believed to be residing in Afghanistan.  Some would argue President Bush used this phrase, “War on Terrorism” figuratively: thus making military analysis of this conflict moot point. Nothing could be more naïve; this war has all the necessary trappings of war; military deployments, invasion, causalities, politics and nation building. For many years politicians attempted to downplay the Vietnam War by referring to it as a “conflict” or “undeclared war.”  Regardless of how history records the Vietnam War it continues to linger in not only the minds of politicians and military leadership, but also the general populace when determining the validity of U.S. military involvement in any shooting wars.  
The conventional approach of the U.S. government to war has been it’s preponderance of an opposing enemy/army/country.   President Bush’s declaration of war made it clear to Afghani leadership, “that the Taliban must turn over …all of the leaders of the al-Qaida who hide in your land.” 1 The key word here is “hide,” when examining al-Qaida military doctrine, which is based on Viet Minh doctrine, there is no list of al-Qaida members, so it is doubtful if Taliban leadership could have turned over significant numbers of al-Qaida even if they wanted to.  The U.S. demand also has religious conations; the current jihad against America and her allies according to bin Laden will lead Arabs and Muslims into the “golden age.”   These idealistic politico-religious statements weigh heavy on the minds and hearts of devout Muslims who do not dismiss bin-Laden as a religious fanatic. After all, bin-Laden to them is a political/religious leader, similar to Ho Chi Minh.   
The defeat of the Taliban was a victory for the U.S. but only in the sense that it temporarily disrupted training and planning in established safe havens for terrorists (al-Qaida). While al-Qaida’s ability to prosecute the war has been impacted, their command and control is still intact; exhibited by the release of audio tapes (latest Oct. 25 2003) by Osama bin Laden and his top deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, encouraging renewed attacks against American crusaders.  Daily guerilla attacks on U.S and coalition forces occupying Afghanistan and Iraq continue in response to command requests. In addition, there are continued suicide bombings of civilian/political targets reinforcing the fact that the war continues.  Bin Laden declared early on that his chosen method of warfare was a “guerilla war” stating, “…where the sons of the nation, and not the military forces, take part in it.”  It is not certain if there is a functioning army of al-Qaida but one thing is for certain, they have not surrendered to the United States. 
Invasion by the United States and occupation of al-Qaida territory has denied al-Qaida access to previous safe-havens. But does this fact alone meet the criteria set out by Clausewitz, regarding the occupation of the enemy’s country?  Where is Bin Laden’s country?  And in this unilaterally declared religious war, should the U.S. consider all Moslem countries as potentially non-friendly states? 
Clausewitz’s emphasis on conquering the enemy’s land is based on the premise that this act will exact a toll on the enemy, wear him down and disrupt his ability to prosecute the war. The U.S. invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq have accomplished this mission but more importantly, sent a firm warning to other countries that providing a safe-haven for terrorists comes with a price tag.  The question now remains will the U.S. continue to invade counties that are sympathetic to these groups as has been stated by President Bush and which one(s) will be next? 
The enemy’s “will.” What progress has the United States made here?  Conquering ones army and occupying his country can have a significant impact the enemies “will” -- who views their country as the “center of gravity,” but does ‘country’ matter in a religions war?  On October 7, 2001 television broadcasts carried an audio tape of bin Laden, he indicated that geography is important when he said “…all the infidel armies leave the land of Muhammad…”  The only question that remains is this a geographic region or religious mantra, meaning the whole world? 
ARE CLAUSEWITZ WRITINGS RELAVANT?
 
The tenants of war set out by Carl Von Clausewitz identified three broad objectives which need to be addressed when contemplating war.2   The United States failed to adequately address these criterions prior to deploying military troops and is now hopelessly encumbered in Iraq and Afghanistan securing the peace and rebuilding these nations. If the “will” of the American people is one of bin Laden’s targets he has made significant inroads to bringing his Middle-East issues into American politics.   
The United States must first accept that conventional military forces employed in guerilla war are at a significant disadvantage and will have limited success in the long term.  Bin Laden can only win if the United States allows him to continue to dictate where, when and who his forces will fight.  Next, this is a religious war, not between West and Moslems but a war between Moslems. Who will stand up and represent the non-fundamentalists Moslems?  Do bin Laden and his army speak for all the Moslems of the world?  It should not be the United States and other coalition members who continue to fight for the rights of Moslems.  
The United States has done very little to address the concerns of Arabs and Moslems, generally tending to discount their religious beliefs when considering diplomatic decisions.  This is a “religious war” and the U.S. ability to change the “enemies will” can only be accomplished, if at all, if U.S. polices directly confront the religious nature/characteristics of this conflict.  The idea that a culture will go to war for religious reasons is alien to the Western world and taking this concept one step further, Westerner’s consider cultures that condone this idea as generally less developed.  It is only when the belligerent is identified to be a person with whom you can negotiate and reach a mutual understanding that progress will be made.   
Historically, after the U.S. gained freedom from Great Britain, has fought wars exclusively due to threats to the “national security.” This trend has resulted in clearly demarcated beginnings and ends to most wars – suing for peace -- meeting the belligerents to sign peace treaties and normalizing relations.  This concept is not as transparent in a “religious war” when the belligerent would rather die then surrender to the Western Christendom, forgoing their religious beliefs.  To win the peace the motivation must be mutually beneficial and not threaten the religious beliefs of either country.
There are those military and political strategists who indicate that Clausewitz’s philosophies apply only to unlimited warfare and that the United States current “War on Terrorism” is a limited war, very similar to Vietnam.  It is convenient to dismiss Clausewitz’s theories of warfare as archaic and therefore not applicable; however, he may have provided politico-military strategists with the criterion needed to prosecute a successful war.  If you cannot identify an enemy or their country maybe you can not attack their will and therefore, should not declare war on them?    If this is what Clausewitz’s intentions were, then maybe the question that should be posed to President Bush and the American people. Is this a war?  Should the U.S. have “officially” declared a “War on Terrorism?” With out an enemy, country and a will to attack how do you know when the war is over?  
President Bush stated in a speech given to a joint session of Congress and the American people on September 20, 2001, “American are asking: How will we fight and win this war? We will direct every resource at our command -- every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon of war -- to the disruption and to the defeat of the global terror network.”1   Yes, Mr. President, but Americans are asking, “Can we win this war?”  

REFERENCES
George W. Bush, Speech “Declaring War on Terrorism,”  20 September 2001,  http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html   (30 October 2003)

[1] Michael Howard and Peter Paret, “Carl Von Clausewitz, On War,” (Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1989). 90

[1] Ahmed S. Hashim, “The World According to Usama Bin Laden,”

[1] Frontline Television Program, Interview with “Osama bin Laden verses the U.S. :Edicts and Statements”

[1] Osama bin Laden, “Declaration of War against the Americans occupying the Land of the two Holy Places,” August 1998.  http://www.mobrien.com/twr/bin_laden.htm  (30 October 2003)
[1] Cecil B. Currey, “Victory At Any Cost: The Genius of Viet Nam’s Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap,” (Washington: Brassey’s, Inc., 1997) 318

[1] Douglas Pike, “PAVN: People’s Army on Vietnam,” (New York: Presidio Press, 1986) 2

[1] Phillip B. Davidson, “Vietnam at War; The History: 1946 – 1975,” (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1988) 26.

[1] Toby Harnden and Anton La Guardia, “Bush declares all-out war on the havens of terrorism,” News Telegraph www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2001.09/14/wwar14.xml

[1] Transcript from statement made by Osam Bin Laden,  http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/monitoring/media_report/1636782.stm